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Abstract 
Using a large and rich data set from administrative sources, we study the effects of children on 
mothers’ employment and earnings in Spain. By being able to pinpoint the event of multiple 
births along a twenty-year panel of women’s work history, we address two methodological 
hurdles in this research: the omitted-variable problem and concerns about twins as a good 
instrument for family size. We find that the effects of fertility on mothers’  labor outcomes 
differ by level of education. Women with only compulsory education experience falls of 17 
percent in employment and 15 percent in earnings, increased duration of non-employed spells, 
and reductions in the likelihood of holding a secondary job or chaining contracts within a 
certain employment spell. Among more educated women, the employment rate drops by a 
mere 4 percent and earnings increase slightly in some cases. Nonetheless, a relatively higher 
employment rate of more educated mothers, besides unexpected changes in family size, 
involves costs in terms of working conditions, like holding temporary contracts. Our results 
indicate that mothers in general have a hard time regaining employment as revealed by the 
sharp increase in the take-up rate of unemployment insurance benefits around the third month 
after the birth. Finally, we are able to obtain some results for the impact of family size on the 
labor supply of a second earner (husband) in the household. For instance, we find that second 
earners tend to compensate for mothers’ income diminution.  
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1 Introduction 
 
The two-way relationship between fertility and the labor market has been the object of much 
research (Browning, 1992). As children increase family responsibilities and the need for 
housework, parents’ employment might be negatively affected. On the other hand, individuals 
may decide to delay or reduce fertility for work-related reasons. In this paper, we focus on 
estimating the effects of childbearing on women’s employment and earnings in Spain. The 
endogeneity of fertility decisions is one of the main difficulties in carrying out this work. 
Researchers have used different strategies to overcome the problem of family size	
endogeneity. Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980b), Bronars and Grogger (1994), and Jacobsen, 
Pearce, and Rosenbloom (1999), use twins in the first birth to estimate the impact of family 
size on a variety of outcomes. Angrist and Evans (1998) exploit parental preferences for 
mixed-sex siblings in order to estimate the effect of a third or higher order child. Hotz, 
McElroy, and Sanders (2005) use miscarriage in the first pregnancy of teenage females as an 
instrument for estimating the effect of delayed childbearing on annual hours of work and 
earnings. Using a sample of women going for fertility treatments, where consequently some 
women cannot become pregnant, Cristia (2008) studies the impact of a first child on the 
mother’s employment. In a cross-country analysis, Bloom, Canning, Fink & Finlay (2009) use 
differences in abortion legislation to estimate the impact of fertility on female labor force 
participation. Bailey (2006) takes advantage of variation in state consent laws about the first 
birth control pill to study its impact on the timing of first births and on women’s labor force 
participation. All these papers show that children affect their mothers’ labor market 
performance. 
 
To add evidence on the causal effect of fertility on the labor market, we use a large and rich 
dataset obtained from administrative files in Spain, the Continuous Sample of Work Histories 
(CSWH)1. These data allow us to contribute to the existing literature in four manners. First, 
we are able to construct a twenty-year panel of women’s work history and pin down the exact 
months of their births. Using multiple births as an instrument for variation in family size, we 
can then estimate short and long-term effects of the number of children on their mothers’ 
labor market performance. Second, we provide additional estimates for a second male worker 
																																																								
1 Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales (MCVL) in Spanish. 
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in the household, most likely the mother’s spouse.2 Third, beyond intensive and extensive 
margins, we explore the effect of family size on a variety of labor market outcomes. This is 
useful for understanding mothers’ choices when facing jobs of different quality and amenities 
(Felfe 2007; Cáceres-Delpiano 2012). Moreover, splitting the sample into two groups--
women with compulsory education at most and women who have achieved more than 
compulsory education--has revealed a critical distinction in gauging the effects of fertility on 
labor market outcomes in Spain. Fourth, distinguishing mothers according to their educational 
level helps clarify the connections between fertility and employment in Spain. The Spanish 
case is particularly interesting in both respects: since the mid-1970s, fertility plummeted and 
unemployment ratcheted up for more than a decade (Ahn and Mira 2001). Educational 
attainment and female labor force participation simultaneously increased. Investigating the 
effects of children on mothers’ employment and earnings can shed light on the forces at work 
in bringing down fertility among Spanish women.  
 
We find that family size has a negative impact on traditional measures of female labor 
attachment for all mothers. Nevertheless, this impact is particularly strong among mothers 
with lower levels of education. For mothers with only compulsory education, we find a 
decrease in the likelihood of employment of 17 percent and a reduction of earnings of 15 
percent. For mothers with more than compulsory education, the impact on employment is less 
than 4 percent and the effect on earnings is insignificant or slightly positive in some cases. 
Moreover, among less educated mothers, an increase in family size is associated with longer 
duration of non-employment spells and stronger reduction in the likelihood of holding a 
secondary job or undergoing a sequence of contracts. We interpret these latter findings as 
costs of fertility in terms of an active “search” and accumulation of experience in the labor 
market, which is consistent with less educated women being more likely to take part-time 
work, become self-employed and accept fixed-term contracts. Another revealing fact, not 
previously shown, is a sharp increase in the unemployment insurance take-up rate by mothers 
around the third month after the birth. This finding suggests that childbearing makes it harder 
for women to regain employment.     
 
																																																								
2 We should keep in mind that estimating the costs of childbearing in terms of labor force participation 
and working time for both spouses, as in Angrist and Evans (1998), is limited by the fact that we 
observe those who still live together as of the date of the census (Cáceres-Delpiano and Simonsen, 
2012). 
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Therefore, one of the main findings in this paper is that distinguishing by the level of 
education is paramount to assess the impact of the number of children on female labor market 
performance in Spain. More specifically, our estimates indicate that the costs of motherhood 
are much higher for less educated women than for women with a greater level of education. 
One is tempted to frame this result in the context of falling fertility and mounting 
unemployment, trends that characterized Spain from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s. To 
motivate this research and illuminate possible interpretations of the results, we have looked at 
the evolution of fertility by levels of education using quarterly samples drawn from the 
Spanish labor force survey for the period 1987-2012. We obtained the total fertility rate by 
dividing the number of children born to a specific cohort of women by all women in such a 
cohort. In Table 1 we compare this indicator of fertility across three selected cohorts of 
women --born in 1950, 1960 and 1970-- by level of education (lower secondary or less and 
upper secondary or more).  
  
Table 1 shows an uneven decline of fertility, remarkably higher among less educated women. 
In a context of rising unemployment and lack of adequate family policies, this fact suggests 
that women with less human capital endured harder living and working conditions in their 
role as mothers of young children than women equipped with more human capital. In 
particular, young persons’ difficulties in getting a first job throughout the 1980s (1960 cohort) 
and 1990s (1970 cohort) made them less suitable for forming a family and having children, 
thus delaying parenthood. On the other hand, increased education appears to have improved 
employment prospects in such a way that the substitution effect could have been partly offset 
by the income effect. This disadvantaged situation of less educated women could even be 
reinforced in a context of positive assortative mating. Although these issues warranty further 
consideration, we restrict ourselves to taking the facts presented in Table 1 just as a main 
motivation for undertaking this research. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, the empirical specification and identification 
strategy are presented. In Section 3, we describe the data used in the analysis and the criteria 
applied to the construction of the samples. In Section 4, we describe the outcomes variables 
used to characterize the individual’s labor market attachment. In Section 5, we explore the 
relationship between multiple births and family size. Sections 6 and 7 present the results of 
estimating the effect of children on mothers’ and second male earners’ labor market 
outcomes, respectively.  We conclude in Section 8. 
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2 Identification 
 
The following expression corresponds to the relationship of interest in the current analysis, 
 
࢟࢏࢚࢙ ൌ ࢾ࢏࢙ ൅ ࢚࢙࣊ ൅ ࢽ࢔࢏࢚࢙ ൅ ࢼࢄ࢏࢚࢙ ൅ ࢿ࢏࢚࢙					(E.1) 
where ݕ௜௧௦ is a specific outcome for mothers or their spouses ݅, at month ݐ in the sample	ݏ; 
݊௜௧࢙ corresponds to the number of children for individual ݅ at time ݐ and sample ݏ, and the 
terms ߜ௜࢙, and ߨ௧࢙ are individual and time-fixed effects, respectively. Finally, ௜ܺ௧࢙ refers to 
other explanatory variables that change over time and across individuals.3 
 
We are interested in parameter 	ߛ , the impact of family size on a mother’s labor force 
attachment or performance (or her spouse’s). However, it is well documented that Ordinary 
Least Square (OLS) estimates of equation (E.1) may be subject to an omitted variable bias 
(Shultz, 2007)4. For example, differences across individuals that define relative gains of 
market production over household production might be simultaneously correlated with 
fertility. Although the individual fixed effect, ߜ௜௦, takes care of those factors correlated with 
family size and labor market variables that are fixed across time, individual factors changing 
over time might still be responsible for a correlation between family size and unobserved 
factors linked to differences in labor market outcomes.  
 
We address the omitted-variable bias using multiple births as a source of variation in family 
size (Angrist and Evans, 1998; Black et al., 2005; Cáceres-Delpiano, 2006; Angrist et al., 
2010; and Cáceres-Delpiano and Simonsen, 2012).  Unlike the cited studies, we have a long 
panel of data and therefore are able to exploit its structure in order to further correct for the 
omitted-variable bias. Specifically, we define ܾ݉௜௧௦ 	as the binary instrument, multiple births, 
that takes a value equal to one for a family (mother) ݅ with multiple births at time ݐ, and zero 
otherwise.  Therefore, we observe the occurrence of the event --multiple births-- across 
individuals. Over time, we observe individual variations associated with multiple births in 
																																																								
3 Other variables in the analysis are the individual's age and a dummy variable that indicates the time 
of a specific birth. 
4 By including fixed effects at the individual level, the model in equation (E.1) corresponds to a fixed 
effect model. Though these models solve the omission of factors that are constant across time at the 
individual level, time-varying factors correlated with the decision of fertility are still a potential source 
of bias. Specifically, individual characteristics or conditions that define the optimal timing for having a 
child could be responsible for this omitted variable bias.  
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comparison with variations for individuals who do not experience the event. This latter 
methodological innovation is possible thanks to the panel data we have at our disposal.  
 
We do the analysis by taking into account the parity at which an increase in family size due to 
multiple births occurs. First, we consider mothers with one or more births (1+), where the 
instrument is multiple births at first birth, ܾ݉௜௧ଵ . Second, we analyze the impact for a sample 
of families with two or more births (2+), where the instrument is multiple births in the second 
delivery, ܾ݉௜௧ଶ . 
 
Whether or not the occurrence of multiple births is an appropriate instrument depends on the 
legitimacy of two well-known assumptions. First, the correlation between multiple births and 
family size is different from zero. This assumption implies that there should be enough 
correlation between multiple births and family size so that an average difference in family 
size exists and can be properly measured. Women who experience multiple births have some 
ability to adjust their subsequent fertility. For example, a mother who would like two children 
may simply stop seeking children if, in her first birth, she delivers twins. This is particularly 
problematic when working with developing countries for their higher observed fertility. 
However, given the heterogeneity in the desired number of children and the fact that in this 
work we use data for Spain (which has one of the lowest fertility rates in the world), we can 
be sure that multiple births produce a shift in family size even at an early stage of fertility life. 
In the following section, we show that multiple births in fact shift the mother’s number of 
children upward for the two subsamples. 
 
The second assumption --non-testable-- is that there is no correlation between the instrument 
(multiple births) and the error term in the regression, so that any impact observed on the 
outcome of interest should necessarily be attributed to a change in family size. A digression 
on the nature of multiple births should help clarify this assumption. There are two types of 
twins, the most common of multiple pregnancies: identical (monozygotic) and fraternal (non-
identical, dizygotic). Identical twins occur when a single embryo divides into two embryos. 
Identical twins have the same genetic makeup and their incidence is equal in all age groups 
and countries (3.5 per 1000 births). Fraternal twins occur when two separate eggs are 
fertilized by separate sperm. The occurrence of fraternal twins, unlike identical twins, varies 
and there are several risk factors that may contribute to increasing its incidence. In fact, this 
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correlation of fraternal twins with other factors has been a motive of concern in the use of 
multiple births as an instrument for variation of family size. 
 
There are two main concerns. First, multiple births have a higher incidence among mothers 
undergoing fertility treatment and also among women who come from families with a 
previous incidence of fraternal twins. Given the sample used, the average age of mothers at 
first child and the cost associated with fertility treatments, we consider this not to be a serious 
problem in our data. Besides, there is no prior information that women act differently based 
on this hereditary background or that hereditary factors are associated with a particular group 
of the population. In this respect, we should emphasize the advantages of having panel data 
because it allows us to include individual fixed effects. Identification results from comparing 
the same mother (or family) before and after the event of multiple births, for factors fixed 
over time should be absorbed by the fixed effect. Therefore, a specification like the one 
presented in (E.1) allows for heterogeneity in terms of the reasons behind the increases in the 
likelihood of multiple births across individuals. By including individual fixed effect, we just 
need the event of multiple births at the individual level to be random and uncorrelated with 
factors defining a higher/lower labor attachment. A similar idea is argued in Cristia (2008), 
who studies the impact of fertility on a mother’s labor attachment using a sample of women 
who underwent fertility treatment but just a random fraction of whom got pregnant. In our 
context, we allow for multiple births to be correlated with factors such as fertility treatments. 
Nevertheless, for a given individual at a specific time, the event is deemed orthogonal to other 
unobservable characteristics.  
 
A second concern was raised by Rosenzweig and Zhang (2006) when studying the impact of 
fertility on child investment in the context of Becker’s quantity and quality model. It refers to 
the possibility that parents might allocate resources to compensate for (or reinforce) a child’s 
endowment shock. Compared to singleton, twins and other higher-order multiple births tend 
to have lower birth weight, higher infant mortality and are more likely to suffer life-long 
disabilities if they survive (Martin and Park, 1999). Thus, mothers (parents) might react by 
reallocating time between the labor market and household production to compensate for the 
shock on children’s endowment. The endowment hypothesis invalidates the exclusion 
restriction because multiple births trigger other causal channels beyond that of fertility. Unlike 
Rosenzweig and Zhang (2006), we cannot verify the robustness of the results by controlling 
for birth weight of children as a measure of their initial endowment. However, as shown in 
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Caceres-Delpiano (2012) and in Caceres-Delpiano and Simonsen (2012), the overall results 
tend to be robust to the inclusion of measures of initial endowment of children5. 
 
In spite of being unable to verify the lack of correlation between the instrumental variable and 
the error term, we are confident that this assumption is fulfilled for several reasons: a) The 
random nature of multiple births; b) the fact that we compare the same individual before and 
after the event of multiple births; and c) the choice of the unit of analysis. 
 
Assuming that the impact of family size as presented in equation (E.1) is constant across 
observations may be unrealistic given the obvious heterogeneity in household preference, 
production technology and constraints. Extensive literature on program evaluation has 
mentioned the importance of addressing this heterogeneity in the impact of a specific 
“treatment.” Heckman (1997) calls attention to the role of the heterogeneity and the 
sensitivity of IV estimates to assumptions about how individuals internalize this heterogeneity 
in their decisions to be part of the treated group (i.e., the selection of family size). Angrist and 
Imbens (1994) have shown that IV estimates can be interpreted as a “Local Average 
Treatment Effects” (LATE) in a setting with heterogeneity in the impacts and individuals 
whose actions take this heterogeneity into account.6 In this case, the IV estimate identifies the 
impact of an increase in family size for those families who, due to multiple births, end up 
having more children than they otherwise would have. Angrist et al. (2010) show that in the 
specific case of using the event of multiple births as an instrument, and due to its perfect 
compliance,7 the LATE can be interpreted as an Average Treatment Effect on the Non-
																																																								
5 Caceres-Delpiano (2012), analyzing a sample of 42 developing countries, provides evidence that the 
impact on mothers’ labor outcomes is robust to the inclusion of children’s birth weight as a proxy for 
children’s endowment, as well as to the use of gender composition as an instrument. Specifically, the 
use of gender composition should not suffer from a contamination coming from shocks in children’s 
endowment. Cáceres-Delpiano and Simonsen (2012) obtain robust results using two alternative 
instruments –gender composition and multiple births--for the impact of family size with US data. 
6 When ߛ௦	is homogenous, multiple births as a valid instrument (as well as any other valid instrument), 
will allow us to identify all the relevant parameters such as the ATE, ATT or ATUT since they all are 
the same (Heckman et al., 2006). Nevertheless, with ߛ௦ being heterogeneous and individuals sorting in 
the gains of family size, the interpretation of the parameter estimated with multiple births (or other 
instruments) is less straightforward. 
7 The average treatment effect on the untreated can be expressed as a weighted average of the average 
treatment on “Never-takers” and the average treatment on “Compliers” (see Angrist and Pischke, 
2009, for details). The terms of “never-takers” and “compliers” come from the analogy with 
randomized trials where some experimental subjects comply with the randomly assigned treatment but 
some do not. Those who do not get “treatment” when randomly assigned to do so are those defined as 
never-takers. Nevertheless, in the specific case of multiple births, mothers (families) who wanted to 
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Treated. That is, the population of compliers is composed of all those mothers who wanted to 
stay at a specific family size, ݏ, as their ideal number of children, yet were nevertheless 
pushed to a bigger family size as a product of multiple births, that is, the “Non-Treated” at ݏ. 
Therefore, the instrument identifies the cost of an increase in family size for families who 
sought an "ݏ" pregnancy (child) but received one (twins) or more (triplets, quadruplets, etc.) 
additional children. In fact, this is the population of individuals whom, at higher values of “ݏ”, 
policymakers have in mind when defining the benefits of family planning program initiatives 
or the magnitude of the cost in terms of labor participation faced by those mothers (families) 
who have chosen to stop their reproductive life. 
 
The panel structure of the data permits us to study the dynamic impact of an increase in 
family size on mothers. Specifically, we estimate the following variant of equation (E.1), 
 
࢟࢏࢚࢙ ൌ ࢾ࢏࢙ ൅ ࢚࢙࣊ ൅ ∑ ࢽ࢜࢔࢏࢚࢙ ∗ ૚࢜ሼ࢜ ࢇ࢜ ൑ ࢚ ൑ ࢈࢜ሽ ൅ ࢼࢄ࢏࢚࢙ ൅ ࢿ࢏࢚࢙							(E.2) 
with 1{*} as an indicator function that takes a value of one when the logic statement {*} is 
true, and zero otherwise. In this second specification, the parameter of interest is ߛ࢜, which 
represents the cost of an increase in family size in period [ܽ௩, ܾ௩] in comparison to those 
periods previous to the birth. In this second specification, the instrument is the variable 
ܾ݉௜௧௦ ∗ 1ሼܽ௩ ൑ ݐ ൑ ܾ௩ሽ, which measures the variation of family size due to multiple births in 
period [ܽ௩, ܾ௩]. In a context of a homogenous treatment, equation (E.2) is informative about 
the dynamic effect of an expected increase in family size. In a context of intrinsic 
heterogeneity, equation (E.2) allows us to observe the impact of family size on different types 
of compliers as well. In the short term, we will be estimating the impact for individuals for 
whom multiple births means a change in the desired fertility but also the impact for those, for 
whom multiple births means just a change in the timing of child  ݏ ൅ 1, in case the desire 
fertility is greater than ݏ. In the longer run, on the other hand, equation (E.2) will capture the 
impact just for the sample for individuals for whom multiple births means a change in the 
complete fertility. Finally, using a specification similar to the one in equation (E.2), but 
including a series of leads (placebo dummies), we check for the robustness of the results. We 
do this by analyzing the timing of the change in the selected outcomes due to an event of 
																																																																																																																																																																													
stay at a specific family size but face a multiple birth in that “ݏ” birth cannot avoid being pushed 
(treated) to a family size bigger than ݏ. Therefore, there are not “never-takers” when using multiple 
births as a source of variation of family size. 
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multiple births. A causal interpretation of the findings would be weakened if we found an 
impact on a specific outcome among mothers who eventually experience a multiple birth, but 
the periods preceding the event of multiple births or the information about them is revealed8.  
 
3 Data 
The data used in this study is the Continuous Sample of Work Histories (CSWH) (Muestra 
Continua de Vidas Laborales - MCVL) issued for the years 2005-2011. The CSWH is 
obtained by matching several administrative registers from Social Security files, the 
Continuous Registry of Municipal Inhabitants, and Tax Agency records. The sample is 
composed of individuals, selected randomly, among all people who had a relation with the 
Social Security system at some point in time during the reference year, previous to the one in 
which the dataset is released. The sample size is 4% of the universe, resulting in more than a 
million individuals for each year. In every release, the longitudinal structure of the sample is 
preserved, where less than 10% of individuals are lost or incorporated every year. 
For each individual in the sample, information about her labor market activity goes as far 
back in time as Social Security records permit --about twenty years counting back from 2005. 
The database is constructed in such a way that workers can be tracked down through all their 
past employment relations registered with Social Security. Dates about the start and end of 
each employment contract are recorded. Demographic characteristics such as gender, age, 
place of birth and household composition are also available.  
Household composition, obtained from the Continuous Registry of Municipal Inhabitants 
(Padrón continuo de habitantes), allows us to use the	 CSWH for this research despite an 
unfortunate feature of the Registry: it does not specify parental relationships between 
members of the household.9 Thus, to link children with their mother, we have designed a 
simple algorithm. First, we restrict the sample to households where there is at least one adult 
woman. Second, we discard households with two or more adult women when their ages make 
it difficult to identify the mother of the children in the household. To check the goodness of 
																																																								
8 Parents can learn whether or not they are pregnant with multiple births during their first echography, 
recommended by the Spanish Genecology Society to be scheduled during the first quarter of 
pregnancy.  
9 Although the main goal of the CSWH is to provide information about work histories of the 
individuals sampled, the dataset has been enriched by matching these individuals with the Registry of 
Municipal Inhabitants (hoja del pardrón). 
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this algorithm, we apply it to the 2001 Spanish census, where family relationships are 
available. The result is that 98.6% of households with individuals younger than 25 have just 
one female member whose age makes her the likely mother. By restricting the sample to 
households with only one potential mom, our algorithm permits us to correctly identify 98.7% 
of children’s mothers in the household. 
To increase accuracy in relating mothers to their children in our dataset, we apply several 
restrictions to the selection of the final sample. First, we exclude households where the 
individual is foreign-born, because they are deemed more likely to include several family 
units. Second, we focus on households where the CSWH sampled individual is a woman aged 
25-55 in 2011. Any other adult women at home are ruled out as children’s mothers on the 
grounds of age differentials. Third, we restrict the analysis to households where the age of the 
oldest individual identified as the child of a woman is less than 25 years old in 2011. Finally, 
once children are identified for each of the sample years (2005-2011), we drop those 
observations with missing information on children's gender or date of birth, or because 
household composition is inconsistent across different sample years. 
We use two subsamples of individuals. The first sample refers to mothers born between 1965 
and 1970. The CSWH for years 2005-2011 allow us to reconstruct the work history of these 
women through much of their fertile life. The second sample refers to households where we 
observe two income earners, the mother and her potential husband. This latter sample is made 
possible by matching two individuals in	 the CSWH. We define all men with an age difference 
lower than 5 years with respect to the mother and who shared the home at some point in the 
period 2005-2011 as potential husbands. In order to ensure a reasonable sample size, the 
sample of second male earners is not restricted to specific birth cohorts of their potential 
spouse. Specifically, it is composed for individuals born between 1951 and 1986. 
 
An important variable in this dataset is the level of education. The original variable in the 
CSWH is obtained from the Continuous Registry of Municipal Inhabitants and is considered 
of poor quality. However, we have benefited from additional measures of the educational 
level from two other data sources, the job seekers registry and the registry of contracts. 
Individuals in the CSWH were matched with those in these two other data sources by the 
Ministry of Labor in cooperation with the Public Employment Service. The main advantage 
of this match is a much better measure of the level of education.    
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4 Outcome Variables 
 
To investigate the effects of children on mothers’ labor market attachment and performance, 
we consider three sets of outcomes. The first set contains six variables that characterize the 
traditional extensive and intensive margins. 1) A dummy variable equal to one if the person is 
employed during the period and zero otherwise. 2) The number of days worked during the 
period. 3) The individual’s base for social security contribution, which is an indicator of 
earnings. 4) Days worked part-time. 5) Days of effective work, obtained by converting part-
time work into a full-time equivalent. 6) Receipt of unemployment insurance (UI), which is a 
dummy variable equal to one in case the individual receives UI and zero otherwise. 
 
The second group of outcome variables refers to characteristics of employment spells and 
employment dynamics. 1) The variable "multiple contracts" equals one for individuals who 
hold more than one single contract in a given period, and zero otherwise. Individuals holding 
more than one contract in a month not only capture the option of a secondary job but they also 
capture an active search in the labor market. Although a secondary job serve to supplement 
earnings for families and to diversify their sources of income, multiple job holding have 
drawbacks, e.g., more difficulties for planning household chores and health problems. 2) The 
variable "chaining" is a dummy that takes the value one for individuals who within a certain 
employment spell are transiting from a second or higher order contract without passing 
through an unemployment spell. A higher fraction of individuals chaining contracts within an 
employment spell not only reflect the distinctive temporality present in Spain but also the 
“skill” of individuals to be renewed or actively search so an employment spell is not 
interrupted. 3) Duration of non-employment spell. 4) Duration of the current spell, regardless 
of its type. Since the variable “chaining” can be measured just for individuals in an 
employment spell, or for duration of non-employment for individuals within a non-
employment spell, we make the distinction for these two variables between current and 
current or last (current/last) spells. By defining the variable “Last/current spell chaining,” for 
example, we include in this definition people in an employment spell as well as those who are 
in a non-employment spell for which we use the information about the last employment spell. 
Finally, the last group of outcome variables refers to the type of employment relationships: 1) 
Full-time versus part-time; 2) Indefinite versus fixed-term; and 3) wage and salary work 
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versus self-employment. We define three dummy variables, “full-time,” “temporary,” and 
“self-employed,” which take the value one if the individual has a full-time contract, a fixed-
term contract, or is self-employed, respectively. Additionally, we add a dummy variable, 
“short contract,” that takes the value one if the individual is in a contract whose duration is a 
year or less, and zero otherwise. As we did with two of the variables in the previous set of 
outcomes, for these four variables we distinguish between the employment relationship in the 
current employment spell and those in the current/last employment spell.   
 
The descriptive statistics for the above-defined variables and other variables included as 
controls in analyses are presented in Table 2. The average age of the individuals in the panel 
is approximately 32 years, which we observe for an average period of 20 years for mothers 
and 23 years for a second male earner. The average age at the beginning of the panel is 
approximately 18 years of age. The individual’s age at first birth is around 28 years, while the 
age at second birth (samples 2 +), is approximately 32 years. The average number of children 
throughout the panel for samples 1+ is approximately 1.03 children. For the sample of 
individuals who have more than two children during the period under analysis (samples 2+), 
the average number of children is around 1.3.10 
 
A panel of 29,000 mothers over 260 months (approximately 9 million observations) makes 
estimations very demanding in computation time. For this reason, we reconverted the monthly 
panel into a quarterly panel for the analysis of mothers but we keep the monthly frequency for 
the analysis on a second earner in the household. 
 
By looking at outcome variables, we find that an average of approximately 70% of women are 
employed during the period of analysis. The average real monthly earnings is around 900€ for 
mothers and approximately 1000€ for their potential husbands. The monthly number of days 
of work is on average around 27 for mothers and 20 for second male earners at home 
(including those workers without a job). This difference in favor of women is explained by 
the fact that the sample of mothers is composed of those cohorts born between 1965 and 
1970, that is, in the middle of their working life, while the sample of second male earners is 
composed of cohorts born between 1951 and 1986; in other words, some of them are in an 
																																																								
10 A value below two is explained by the fact that we observe an individual for some periods before 
the second birth takes place, which pushes down the average number of children over the period of 
analysis. 
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early stage of their working life and the older cohorts are already or close to retirement. 
Nevertheless, this difference in the days worked disappears when we look at the measure of 
days of work adjusted for days of part-time work. Regarding the percentage receiving 
Unemployment Insurance (UI), the average figure is approximately 10% of mothers and 6% 
of male second earners. Concerning the type of employment or contract, mothers (male 
earners) are 55 (80) percent in full-time jobs, 30 (26) have temporary contracts and 15 (24) 
percent are self-employed.  
 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistic for mothers by level of education: lower secondary or 
less (“Just Compulsory”) and upper secondary or more (“More than Compulsory”). 
Consistent with a higher opportunity cost associated with more human capital, we observe 
that mothers with more than compulsory education: are more likely to be employed, work 
more days (after adjusting for days of partial work), enjoy higher monthly earnings, more 
likely to be in full-time employment, and less likely to have a temporary contract or a short-
term contract (a year or less). Also, more educated mothers are less likely to receive 
unemployment insurance benefits.   
 
5 Multiple Births and Family Size 
 
A high correlation between multiple births and family size is a testable necessary condition to 
ensure the validity of the instrument, because only in that case an average difference in family 
size exists and can be properly measured. To estimate the relationship between multiple births 
and family size, we first estimate the following equation: 
 
࢔࢏࢚࢙ ൌ ࢾ࢏࢙ ൅ ࢚࢙࣊ ൅ ࣂ࢓࢈࢏࢚࢙ ൅ ࢼࢄ࢏࢚࢙ ൅ ࢿ࢏࢚࢙									(E.3) 
 
OLS estimates of the impact of multiple births on the number of children, ߠ, are presented in 
Table 4. Estimates for the specification above, with and without controls,11 are presented in 
																																																								
11 The specification without controls includes the dummy variable for multiple births, individual fixed 
effects and an indicator for the time of the specific birth. In addition to these variables, the 
specification with controls includes a time-fixed effect by birth cohort (a flexible form to control for 
the age of the individual), a time-fixed effect interacted with a dummy variable indicating whether or 
not an individual has just compulsory education, and year of birth effects interacted with the dummy 
indicating compulsory education attainment at most. 
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columns 1 and 2 for mothers, and in columns 3 and 4 for second male earners. Comparing the 
specifications with and without controls, it appears that the impact of multiple births is robust 
to the inclusion of other variables in the model. This finding is important because it shows 
that at least on the basis of these observed variables, multiple births are not strongly correlated 
with other variables, and that the positive impact observed on the number of children is not 
due to the correlation with these other variables. Second, for both samples and specifications, 
there is a positive and statistically significant coefficient associated with multiple births (with 
a significance level of 1%) and the F statistics for the null of weak instruments, over the 
critical values.  
 
The magnitudes reported in Table 4 show that the event of multiple births increases the 
number of children. Specifically, a family that experiences multiple births has approximately 
0.6 to 0.9 more children than another family which in the same birth experiences a singleton. 
Our estimates are in line with those reported in previous studies that use the same source of 
identification (Angrist et al. 2010; Cáceres-Delpiano 2006; Angrist and Evans 1998). For 
Israel, Angrist et al. (2010) find an impact of multiple births ranging from 0.43 to 0.69, 
depending on the sample considered, and Black et al. (2005) find an impact ranging from 0.67 
to 0.82	for Norway. 
 
As we already mentioned, in a context of intrinsic heterogeneity, there are two types of 
compliers. In the short term, we have those individuals for whom multiple births means a 
change in the desired fertility but also the impact for those for whom multiple births means 
just a change in the timing of the (ݏ ൅ 1) child, in case the desired fertility is greater than ݏ. In 
the long term, the compliers should be those for whom multiple births just alter the desired 
family size. We investigate this composition of compliers by estimating the following model, 
 
࢔࢏࢚࢙ ൌ ࢾ࢏࢙ ൅ ࢚࢙࣊ ൅ ∑ ࣂ࢜࢓࢈࢏࢚࢙ ∗ ૚࢜ሼ࢜ ࢇ࢜ ൑ ࢚ ൑ ࢈࢜ሽ ൅ ࢼࢄ࢏࢚࢙ ൅ ࢿ࢏࢚࢙	        (E.4) 
 
The OLS estimates of the impact of multiple births between ࢇ࢜ and ࢈࢜ quarters after the birth, 
ࣂ࢜, is reported in Table 5. The points estimates show a significant impact beyond 16 quarters 
after the birth, which, given the average spacing observed in Spain, confirms that the group of 
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compliers not only captures the impact in the timing of children but also the impact of an 
increase in family size.  
 
Finally, Table 6 reports the estimates of the impact of multiple births on family size by 
mothers’ level of education. As the table reveals, the impact of multiple births does not seem 
to be driven by one particular level of education because the magnitude of the impact is 
similar across the two groups of women. This finding lends us support to study the effects of 
fertility on labor market outcomes by level of education. Moreover, it dispels concerns that 
the compliers in the case of multiple births are just among the groups with higher levels of 
education. 
 
6 The Effect of Children on Mothers’ Labor Market Outcomes 
 
The two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) estimates of the impact of the number of children on the 
variables that characterize the labor market participation of mothers are presented in Tables 7 
to 9. Each column corresponds to a specific outcome, while the rows of the table correspond 
to different sub-samples distributed in three panels: panel I for the entire sample, panel II for 
individuals with compulsory education, and panel III for individuals with more than 
compulsory education. For each of the panels, two estimates are reported. The first row refers 
to households with one or more children (1+) and the second row refers to households with 
two or more children (2+). 
 
Table 7 reports the impact of the number of children for the outcome variables that 
characterize the traditional extensive and intensive margins. The results for the entire sample 
of mothers (panel I, sub-samples 1+ and 2+) indicate that an additional child is associated 
with a reduction in the likelihood that a mother is employed by approximately 5 percentage 
points, which in terms of the sample means corresponds to approximately a 7 percent 
decrease. Though we do not observe an impact on the total number of days worked, we do 
observe a reduction in the measure of days worked after adjusting for days of partial work of 
approximately 4 days in a quarter. This result is consistent with the increase in days of partial 
work observed for the sample 1+. Nevertheless, for the sample 2+, we even observe a 
reduction among the days of partial work, which is consistent with the idea that individuals 
have “margins” to adjust when facing an unexpected increase in family size. Nevertheless, 
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when mothers have fewer margins or are increasingly constrained, i.e., already have children 
(at 2+), they are faced with no alternative but to adjust on extensive margins. In line with this 
hypothesis, we observe a reduction in earnings at 2+ but an increase at 1+. Is that increase in 
earnings distributed among all mothers? The analysis by level of education shows that it is 
not. 
 
Estimations by the mother’s level of education reveal considerable differences in the results 
(panels II and III). The likelihood of being employed is reduced by 10 percentage points (17 
percent in terms of the sample mean) among lower educated women for both samples, 1+ and 
2+; and by 3 percentage points (4 percent) among more educated mothers, only for the sample 
2+. In addition, it is just among mothers with lower levels of education that a reduction in 
earnings is observed, approximately 250€ per quarter (15 percent in terms of the sample 
mean). On the other hand, among mothers with more than compulsory education, we observe 
an increase in earnings for the sample 1+ and an insignificant change for the sample 2+. That 
is, among more educated women with stronger preferences for a smaller family size 
(compliers in the sample 1+), an unexpected change in family size rather than reducing 
earnings is associated with an increase of them. However, still among more educated mothers 
but among those with preferences for a bigger family size (sample 2+), the increase in family 
size now is not associated with an increase in earnings, which is explained by the decrease in 
the likelihood of being employed by 2.5 percentage points. Thus, these results indicate that 
the number of children have a heterogeneous effect on mothers’ labor attachment. Among 
mothers with a relatively lower “market” opportunity cost, that is, with lower levels of human 
capital or stronger preferences for household production (more children), an increase in 
family size seems to foster specialization in household production. Whereas mothers with a 
relatively higher opportunity cost and a smaller desired family size react to an unexpected 
change in the number of children appear to increase their specialization in market production. 
 
Are these changes long-lasting or short-lived? The dynamic analysis for this first group of 
outcomes is presented graphically. For the entire sample, results are reported in Figure 1 (1+) 
and in Figure 2 (2+). Figures 3 and 4 report the results by level of education for samples 1+ 
and 2+, respectively. The results lend support to the finding that mothers with lower levels of 
education bear a higher cost of increasing family size. By contrast, more educated mothers are 
the ones driving the increase in earnings in the static specification reported in Table 7. But 
now we can see that this positive impact on earnings (sample 1+) is short-lived because 16 
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quarters after the birth the effect wanes. The loss of earnings among less educated women, on 
the other hand, is apparent as long as 16 quarters after the birth for both samples. How can 
mothers with more education “protect” earnings? The answer lies in two other results: First, 
they do not experience a reduction in extensive margins (samples 1+ and 2+); and second, for 
some quarters, they experience an increase in the adjusted days of work (samples 1+ and 2+), 
which is driven by a reduction in the number of days of part-time work (sample 1+). Mothers 
with lower levels of education facing an increase in family size, on the other hand, not only 
reduce extensive margins in the short and long run, but also reduce intensive margins over the 
whole period under analysis. Specifically, it is among mothers with lower levels of education 
where there is a relatively stronger increase of part-time work in both the short and long run.  
 
The dynamic analysis serves to uncover the effect of children on the likelihood of receiving 
UI in the short run. We now find that, different from the estimates in the last column of Table 
7, an increase in family size raises the likelihood that the mother receives unemployment 
benefits during the first 9 quarters after the birth. This result is robust to the division of the 
sample by educational level. For the whole sample, the increase in family size causes an 
increase in an UI receipt of 5 percentage points, or a 50 percent increase in relation to the 
sample mean. 
 
The results for the second group of outcomes (Table 8) reveal that an increase in family size 
reduces the probability that a mother holds more than one job in a given period. The finding 
that this reduction is stronger among mothers with lower levels of education for sample 1+ is 
consistent with two hypotheses. First, households where mothers specialize in household 
production require fewer market goods and therefore they are less likely to need a 
complementary source of income. Second, an arrangement to complement income in the form 
of a secondary job is hard to reconcile with a bigger family size. For example, using data for 
42 developing countries, Cáceres-Delpiano (2012) find that mothers who experience an 
increase in family size tend to leave jobs that are harder to combine with motherhood such as 
jobs with a higher degree of informality. Within this group of outcomes we find as well that 
mothers are less likely to “chain” contracts within a spell of employment. This finding is 
consistent with mothers being less likely to go from job to job without an unemployment 
spell, i.e., have searched for work while employed. Third, though for the complete sample it 
looks as if an increase in family size is associated with a reduction in the duration of non-
employment spells, the analysis by level of education shows that this result is driven by more 
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educated mothers. In fact, among mothers with lower levels of education the duration of the 
non-employment spells increases.12 Finally, the last outcome that measures the duration of the 
spells regardless of whether they are employed or non-employed episodes shows (for sample 
1+) an increase for those mothers with more education but a reduction for mothers with lower 
levels of education. This finding, together with an increase (decrease) in the duration of non-
employment episodes for mothers with lower (higher) levels of education, indicated that an 
increase in family size is associated with a reduction (increase) in duration of employment 
episodes for this group. That is, the increase in family size entails a loss in work experience 
that is particularly significant among the less educated females. More educated mothers are 
able to reduce the duration of non-employment spells with the consequent gain in tenure and 
experience. 
 
In Figures 5 to 8, we present the results of the dynamic analysis for the six outcomes, 
following the same structure used previously. First, the impact of children on the likelihood of 
holding two or more contracts is negative across all periods and for both educational levels. 
Although this negative impact is stronger for lower educated mothers, an overlap of the 
confidence intervals does not rule out that the impact is similar to that among more educated 
mothers. Nevertheless, just for the group of mothers with lower levels of education, we can 
ensure a statistical significance, not only in the long run, but also in the short-run. Second, 
results from an analysis that would not allow for differences in the impact of family size in the 
short and long run, like those reported in Tables 7 to 9, would oversee a positive impact on 
chaining contracts in the short run, which is driven by the sample of more educated mothers. 
Nevertheless, in the long run (beyond 4 years after the birth) for both groups of women, we 
obtain a negative impact on the likelihood of chaining contracts within an employment 
episode. Finally, the dynamic analysis reveals the nature of the differences in the impact of 
children on the duration of non-employment spells	 by educational levels. Before the third year 
after the birth, more children reduce duration of non-employed spells, regardless of mothers’ 
education. Beyond the fourth year after the birth, the impact becomes positive for mothers 
with lower levels of education. That is, all mothers with a stronger preference for a smaller 
family size (sample 1+) continue to search actively in the short-run, but only mothers with 
more than compulsory education are able to go on in active search four years after the birth. 
																																																								
12 For less educated mothers of 2 or more children, we observe a reduction in the duration of non-
employment spells if they are currently non-employed. As already indicated, this measure refers to 
duration of non-employment spells of non-employed mothers, thus with a censored duration.   
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Then, if we were to pick “winners” in terms of their ability to buffer the costs of an 
unexpected increase in family size, they would be compliers mothers with more than 
compulsory education in sample 1+ (with a relatively stronger preference for a smaller family 
size).  
 
For the complete sample of mothers in sample 1+ and in sample 2+ (panel I) there are some 
noteworthy differences in the impact of an increase in family size on contract characteristics 
(Table 9). At 1+, an increase in the number of children reduces the probability of full-time 
employment and increase the probability of holding a temporary contract and of being self-
employed. For the sample 2+ on the other hand, family size increases the likelihood of full-
time employment and reduces the likelihood of being in temporary employment. Estimations 
by levels of education revealed that the latter results are driven by more educated mothers.  
 
This suggests first that there is no free lunch. Among more educated mothers in sample 1+, as 
our previous findings show, it is where we did not observe a reduction in extensive margins. 
We found a reduction in the number of days of partial work, and we observed a reduction in 
the duration of non-employment episodes; that is, an (unexpected) increase in family size is 
associated with higher specialization in the labor market.  This higher specialization should 
eventually imply an accumulation of human capital (experience, tenure) that would lead to 
permanent contracts and full-time employment, but we observe the opposite result. For 
sample 2+, though, we observed a reduction in the probability of being employed. The 
evidence shows that mothers who stay in the labor market keep jobs of better quality. 
 
On the other hand, for mothers with lower levels of education in the sample 1+, among which 
we found the biggest reduction in terms of extensive and intensive margins as well as an 
increase in the duration of non-employment episodes, we observe that an increase in family 
size is associated with a reduction in the likelihood of holding a full-time job, an increase in 
mothers holding a temporary contract and an increase in mothers who are self-employed. For 
this group of mothers, who have a lower level of education but for the sample 2+, though we 
observe a reduction in temporal contracts and an increase in self employment, the channel 
seems to be a reduction in extensive margins since, because when we define this variables 
also using the information about the last contracts for those that are not employed, we do not 
observe a change associated with an increase in family size. 
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As done previously, figures 9 to 12 present the dynamic analysis of outcomes characterizing 
the employment relationship. Figures 11 and 12 indicate once again that when a significant 
difference in level of education exists, the higher cost is for less educated mothers. 
Specifically, for sample 1+ beyond four years after the birth, we observe an increase in the 
likelihood that a contract has duration inferior to twelve months among mothers with lower 
levels of education. Also for the sample 1+, though for both groups beyond the four years 
after the birth there is a reduction in the likelihood of holding a full-time contract, mothers 
with more than compulsory education in the short run are the ones for whom there is an 
increase in the likelihood of holding a full-time job. For sample 2+, we find that while an 
increase in family size induces an increase in the likelihood of holding a full-time job for 
mothers with more education, this probability falls for mothers with just or less than 
compulsory education. 
 
Finally, using a specification similar to the one in equation (E.2) but including a series of 
leads (placebo dummies), we check the robustness of the results by analyzing the timing of 
the change in the selected outcomes due to an event of multiple births. A causal interpretation 
of the findings would be weakened if we found an impact in a specific outcome among 
mothers who eventually experience multiple births, but the periods preceding the event of 
multiple births or the information about them is revealed. Nevertheless, parents can learn 
whether or not they are pregnant with multiple births during their first echography, 
recommended by the Spanish Genecology Society to be scheduled during the first quarter of 
pregnancy. The results of the analysis are presented in figures 13 to 18. In each of the figures, 
two vertical lines are drawn. The first line from left to right represents the time of conception 
approximately (3 quarters before birth). The second line represents the date of birth. For none 
of 16 outcomes in the two samples with the exception of chaining in sample 1+, we find that 
multiple births have a significant impact previous to conception.   
 
7 The Effect of Children on Second Male Earners’ Labor Market Outcomes 
 
The results for a second male earner, which we address as the potential husband of a woman 
identified as the mother of the children in the household, are presented in Tables 10 and 11.13 
																																																								
13 As the CSWH is a random sample of employed individuals, it is possible to observe two or more 
working members of the same family. This allows us to identify a second male earner in the same 
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Table 10 presents the results for the first two groups of outcomes: Panel I presents the results 
for the five outcomes that we defined as the traditional extensive and intensive margins; and 
Panel II contains the groups of outcomes intended to describe the transition between 
employment and non-employment spells. Finally, Table 11 reports the findings for the 
outcomes characterizing the type of contracts. For each of these three outcomes groups, the 
impact of fertility is reported for samples 1+ and 2+. Nevertheless, given the considerable, 
smaller sample size, we restrict the analysis to the complete samples and we do not divide the 
sample by the level of education.14 
  
Looking at the two first groups of outcomes, Table 10, we observe a considerable difference 
in the impact of fertility between samples 1+ and 2+. On the one hand, for the sample 2+ we 
find evidence that is fully consistent with the hypothesis that a second earner would 
compensate for losses caused by a reduction of the mother’s labor attachment. Specifically, 
we observe an increase in the likelihood of being employed, an increase in the number of days 
worked, a reduction in the probability of using UI, an increase in the likelihood of holding a 
secondary job, an increase in the likelihood of chaining contracts within an employment spell, 
and an increase in earnings. For sample 1+, on the other hand, an increase in family size with 
the exception of the outcomes of “earnings” and “multiple contracts” has an impact with the 
sign opposite to the one found in 2+. Nevertheless, as well as for sample 2+, we still observe 
that an additional child in the family is associated with an increase in earnings. Part of this 
increase in earnings is explained by the increase in the likelihood that an individual would 
hold more than one contract in a month, but the answer is also found in the type of contract 
held for this second earner. For sample 1+, we observe that an increase in family size 
increases the likelihood that a second earner is working full time, reduces the likelihood of 
holding a temporary contract and reduces the likelihood of being self-employed. In fact, for 
this same group of outcomes but for sample 2+, we observe the impact of family size has the 
opposite sign for these outcomes. Therefore, the results indicate that a second earner 
(husband) tends to compensate the reduction of income taking place in the household. 
Nevertheless, not all individuals “make ends meet” with the same recipe. Some individuals 
																																																																																																																																																																													
household. To make him more likely to be the mother’s spouse, we focus on men with an age 
difference of 5 or less years with the sampled mother in the same household.  
14 The identification in our analysis comes from the presence of multiple births and the comparison of 
outcomes before and after the event. Because multiple births are rare, a large sample of individuals is 
required. Out of 30,000 mothers with one or more children (sample 1+), we identified 540 multiple 
births. We also observe twins for 30 families in our sample of twenty-five hundred second male 
earners.  
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increase their participation in the labor market but sacrifice “the quality” of the job (sample 
2+). Other individuals increase the quality of the job and reduce some intensive and extensive 
margins (sample 1+). 
 
8 Conclusions and remarks 
 
In this paper, we use administrative data from Spain to investigate the effects of children on 
mothers’ employment and earnings. We tackle the omitted-variable problem with a plausible 
instrument for family size. As in many previous studies, we chose the event of multiple births. 
A major difference with preceding work, though, is that we take advantage of having data on 
mothers’ labor market outcomes on a monthly base for a twenty-year period. Thus, the panel 
structure of the data has been critical in allowing us to show that the effects of children on 
mothers’ employment and earnings are more clearly exposed in a dynamic context. In 
particular, heterogeneity of the cost of childbearing is emphasized. If the effects of a third 
child are quite similar across households, the effects of a second child vary over time, 
diminishing with children’s age and vanishing in some cases. Therefore, only with a long 
panel of data on women’s work history has it been possible to gauge the temporary nature of 
the effects of children on their mothers’ labor market attachment. 
 
Another important novelty in our paper is that the effects of fertility on mothers’ labor 
outcomes --at least in Spain-- greatly differ by their level of education. Women with 
compulsory education at most experience falls of 17 percent in employment and 15 percent in 
earnings. Other effects of childbearing are increased duration of non-employed spells and 
reductions in the likelihood of holding a secondary job or chaining contracts within a certain 
employment spell. As regards more educated women, their employment rate drops by 4 
percent and earnings increase slightly in some cases. This relative advantage of having more 
education does not prevent women, regardless of schooling, from the costs of becoming 
mothers in terms of labor market outcomes. Our results indicate that mothers in general have 
a hard time regaining employment if they stop working because of motherhood. This is 
revealed by a striking and sharp increase in the take-up rate of unemployment insurance 
benefits around the third month after the birth.  
 
Moreover, unlike previous work, we have been able to provide some results for the impact of 
family size on the labor supply of a second male earner (husband) in the household. 
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Specifically, we find that second earners tend to compensate for mothers’ income diminution. 
Nevertheless, while some individuals increase their participation in the labor market but 
sacrifice “the quality” of the job (sample 2+), other individuals increase the quality of the job, 
and reduce some intensive and extensive margins (sample 1+). 
 
Our work contributes to shedding light on the relationship between mothers of young children 
and the labor market. The analysis has been particularly illuminating for a country that in less 
than two decades went from having a relatively high fertility rate to one of the lowest in the 
world. Many factors may have contributed to this demographic development. However, we 
interpret the results in this paper as an indication of the particularly harsh labor market 
conditions faced by less educated mothers in Spain. This prompted a sharper drop in fertility 
and probably encouraged increased schooling, which pushed fertility further down. More 
research is needed to assess whether balancing work and family continues to be a hurdle for 
younger generations. Although high levels of immigration have increased fertility and slowed 
down the aging of the population, our findings suggest that the current situation of 
skyrocketing unemployment and feebler family support may hasten lower-educated (both 
native and immigrant) women to have fewer and fewer children. 
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Table 1 
Total fertility rates by levels of education and cohort in Spain. 
 
 
 Lower secondary or less             Upper secondary or more  
Cohort 
Total 
Fertility 
Rate (1) 
Points 
change 
across 
cohorts 
% 
Change 
across 
cohorts 
Total 
Fertility  
Rate (2) 
Points 
change 
across 
cohorts 
% 
Change 
across 
cohorts 
TFR ratio 
(1)/(2)     
1950   2.16 -  -  1.65 -   -    1.31  
1960   1.78  -0.38    -17.67 1.45   -0.20    -12.15    1.23 
1970   1.44  -0.34    -19.14 1.27   -0.18    -12.47    1.14 
  
Source: Labor Force Survey (1987-2012).      
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics. 
 Mother Male earner 
 1+ 2+ 1+ 2+ 
Employed 0.69 0.68 0.73 0.72 
Days worked 27.63 27.68 20.93 20.93 
 (8.83) (8.79) (13.97) (13.97) 
Monthly earnings 914.40 916.07 1037.80 1043.68 
 (786.03) (806.37) (872.85) (884.01) 
Effective days worked 19.03 18.83 21.35 21.38 
 (13.93) (14.00) (13.64) (13.64) 
Days of part-time work 3.23 3.17 0.68 0.66 
 (9.28) (9.21) (4.43) (4.39) 
Receive unemployment insurance (UI) 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.06 
Multiple contracts in a month 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 
Last/current spell chaining contracts 0.44 0.43 0.54 0.55 
Current spell: chaining contracts 0.38 0.37 0.53 0.54 
Duration last/current non-employment spell 32.35 33.90 0.14 0.14 
 (45.65) (46.64) (2.88) (2.76) 
Duration current non-employment spell 15.44 15.96 0.03 0.03 
 (37.08) (37.78) (1.09) (0.71) 
Duration current spell 39.19 40.09 36.18 36.00 
 (47.79) (48.35) (54.10) (53.13) 
Last/current contract: Full time 0.39 0.37 0.56 0.55 
Last/current contract: Temporary 0.21 0.21 0.19 0.20 
Last/current contract: Self-employed 0.10 0.11 0.17 0.18 
Last/current contract: Short 0.37 0.37 0.21 0.20 
Current contract: Full time 0.34 0.32 0.55 0.54 
Current contract: Temporary 0.14 0.14 0.19 0.20 
Current contract: Self-employed 0.08 0.09 0.17 0.18 
Current contract: Short 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.19 
Age of the individual 32.63 32.62 32.05 31.55 
 (6.82) (6.83) (9.31) (8.82) 
Age at first child 28.84 27.83 28.24 28.04 
 (5.24) (4.65) (7.28) (5.94) 
Age at the second child 32.31 32.30 32.79 32.79 
 (4.48) (4.48) (5.55) (5.55) 
Number of children (NC) 1.03 1.28 0.91 1.12 
 (0.91) (0.99) (0.88) (1.02) 
Complete NC 1.76 2.20 1.71 2.23 
 (0.70) (0.49) (0.72) (0.52) 
MB first birth 0.018 0.029 0.010 0.017 
MB second birth 0.014 0.014 0.012 0.012 
Age first time in the panel 18.55 18.54 17.77 17.77 
 (1.73) (1.73) (7.95) (6.78) 
Age last time in the panel 43.46 43.46 42.69 42.70 
 (1.71) (1.70) (7.94) (6.77) 
Months in the panel 261.97 262.23 281.50 285.36 
 (45.30) (45.44) (35.77) (29.87) 
Number of individuals 29030 18462 2672 1556 
Standard deviations in parentheses. Standard deviations for proportions are not reported. 
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Table 3 
Descriptive statistics by level of education of the mother. 
 Just compulsory More than compulsory 
 1+ 2+ 1+ 2+ 
Employed 0.61 0.59 0.75 0.75 
Days worked 27.11 27.11 28.04 28.10 
 (9.56) (9.58) (8.19) (8.11) 
Monthly earnings 617.78 592.69 1146.58 1163.18 
 (531.34) (523.13) (870.56) (892.89) 
Effective days worked 16.45 16.04 21.03 20.95 
 (14.34) (14.39) (13.26) (13.31) 
Days of part-time work 3.43 3.35 3.07 3.04 
 (9.53) (9.42) (9.08) (9.05) 
Receive UI 0.12 0.12 0.08 0.08 
Multiple contracts in a month 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.05 
Last/current spell chaining contracts 0.36 0.34 0.51 0.50 
Current spell: chaining contracts 0.29 0.26 0.46 0.45 
Duration last/current non-employment 
spell 36.18 38.26 28.59 29.69 
 (48.80) (50.08) (41.99) (42.63) 
Duration current non-employment spell 15.40 16.03 15.47 15.90 
 (38.80) (39.82) (35.30) (35.68) 
Duration current spell 39.93 41.45 38.59 39.04 
 (49.72) (50.93) (46.21) (46.26) 
Last/current contract: Full time 0.30 0.28 0.46 0.45 
Last/current contract: Temporary 0.24 0.25 0.18 0.18 
Last/current contract: Self-employed 0.12 0.12 0.09 0.10 
Last/current contract: short 0.44 0.44 0.32 0.32 
Current contract: Full Time 0.24 0.21 0.41 0.40 
Current contract: Temporal 0.16 0.16 0.13 0.14 
Current contract: Self-employed 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 
Current contract: Short 0.21 0.21 0.18 0.18 
Standard deviations in parentheses. Standard deviations for proportions are not reported. 
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Table 4 
OLS estimates of the impact of multiple births on number of 
children (first stage). Each pair of coefficient and standard error 
corresponds to a different regression.	F-statistic for weak 
instruments in italics.  
 Mothers Male earner 
 Unconditional Conditional Unconditional Conditional 
1+ 0.653*** 0.632*** 0.748*** 0.713*** 
 [0.004] [0.003] [0.009] [0.013] 
     
 28434.25 33899.18 6610.88 3056.54 
     
2+ 0.935*** 0.937*** 0.944*** 0.925*** 
 [0.005] [0.003] [0.015] [0.013] 
     
  28932.93 110000 4057.98 5415.21 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent; ** 
significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. The specification is 
the one presented in equation (E.3). The specification without controls 
(unconditional) includes a dummy variable for multiple births, individual 
fixed effects and indicator for the time of the specific birth. The second 
specification, conditional, additionally to the previous variables includes 
time fixed effect by birth cohort, time fixed effect interacted with a 
dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual has completed 
compulsory education and finally year of birth effects interacted with the 
dummy indicating compulsory education. 1+ and 2+ stand for the samples 
of individuals with one, two or more children, respectively. Stock-Yogo 
weak ID test critical values for 10%, 15%, 20% maximal IV size are16.38, 
8.96 and 6.66, respectively. 
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Table 5 
OLS estimates of the dynamic impact of multiple births on number of 
children (first stage). 
 Mothers Male earner 
Quarters since birth 1+ 2+ 1+ 2+ 
[0-3] 0.711*** 0.951*** 0.786*** 1.016*** 
 [0.008] [0.007] [0.034] [0.030] 
[4-6]  0.686*** 0.947*** 0.799*** 1.001*** 
 [0.009] [0.008] [0.036] [0.031] 
[7-9] 0.677*** 0.947*** 0.974*** 0.978*** 
 [0.009] [0.008] [0.036] [0.036] 
[10-12] 0.654*** 0.942*** 0.935*** 0.967*** 
 [0.009] [0.008] [0.036] [0.036] 
[13-15] 0.641*** 0.937*** 0.881*** 0.963*** 
 [0.009] [0.008] [0.036] [0.036] 
16 or more 0.567*** 0.927*** 0.617*** 0.881*** 
 [0.004] [0.003] [0.014] [0.013] 
     
  5032.26 15219.27 473.16 815.2 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent; ** significant 
at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. Each column presents the estimated 
from a different regression which specification is the one presented in equation 
(E.4). The controls included are individual fixed effects, indicator for the time 
of the specific birth, time fixed effect by year of birth cohort, time fixed effect 
interacted with a dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual has 
completed compulsory education and finally year of birth effects interacted 
with the dummy indicating compulsory education. 1+, and 2+ stand for the 
samples of individuals with one, two or more children, respectively. F-statistic 
for weak instruments in italics. Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values for 
10%, 15%, 20% maximal IV size are16.38, 8.96 and 6.66, respectively. 
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Table 6 
Impact of multiple births on number of children (first stage) by 
level of education of the mother. 
 Just compulsory More than compulsory 
 Unconditional Conditional Unconditional Conditional 
1+ 0.686*** 0.670*** 0.631*** 0.611*** 
 [0.007] [0.006] [0.005] [0.004] 
     
2+ 0.912*** 0.933*** 0.942*** 0.940*** 
  [0.009] [0.005] [0.007] [0.004] 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent; ** 
significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. The specification is 
the one presented in equation (E.3). Covariates for each of the 
specifications are the same as those reported in table 3. 
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Table 7 
2SLS estimates of the impact of fertility on mother’s traditional extensive and intensive margins. 
   Employed 
Days 
worked 
Quarterly 
earnings 
Effective 
days 
worked 
Days of 
partial 
work 
Receive 
unemployment 
insurance 
         
I Total 1+ -0.050*** -0.426 58.604*** -4.099*** 1.093*** 0.003 
   [0.006] [0.335] [22.691] [0.505] [0.329] [0.004] 
  2+ -0.058*** -0.448 -89.264*** -3.941*** -1.063*** 0.006 
   [0.006] [0.314] [21.565] [0.475] [0.308] [0.004] 
         
II 
Compulsory 
education 1+ -0.130*** 0.541 -276.634*** -11.768*** 2.079*** -0.001 
   [0.010] [0.572] [26.843] [0.811] [0.535] [0.007] 
  2+ -0.104*** -0.532 -265.442*** -9.150*** -0.057 0.009 
   [0.009] [0.543] [25.070] [0.767] [0.501] [0.007] 
         
III 
More than 
compulsory 1+ -0.003 -0.990** 269.685*** 0.547 0.418 0.004 
   [0.008] [0.403] [34.034] [0.643] [0.416] [0.005] 
  2+ -0.026*** -0.418 34.982 -0.312 -1.732*** 0.004 
      [0.007] [0.375] [32.376] [0.603] [0.389] [0.005] 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 
percent. The specification is the one presented in equation (E.1). The controls included are individual fixed effects, 
indicator for the time of the specific birth, time fixed effect by year of birth cohort, time fixed effect interacted with 
a dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual has completed compulsory education and finally year of 
birth effects interacted with the dummy indicating compulsory education. 
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Table 8 
2SLS estimates of the impact of fertility on mother’s selected outcomes. 
   
Multiple 
contracts 
Last/current 
spell: 
Chaining 
Current 
spell: 
Chaining 
Duration 
last/current 
non-
employment 
spell 
Duration 
current non-
employment 
spell 
Duration 
current spell 
         
I Total 1+ -0.018*** -0.020*** -0.028*** -3.842*** -1.235** 2.743*** 
   [0.004] [0.006] [0.005] [0.723] [0.600] [0.618] 
  2+ -0.019*** -0.047*** -0.059*** -0.53 -3.448*** -0.013 
   [0.003] [0.005] [0.005] [0.675] [0.568] [0.588] 
         
II 
Compulsory 
education 1+ -0.033*** -0.054*** -0.078*** 1.889* 2.023** -2.105** 
   [0.006] [0.009] [0.008] [1.133] [0.936] [1.027] 
  2+ -0.015*** -0.071*** -0.082*** 3.689*** -3.009*** -0.333 
   [0.006] [0.008] [0.007] [1.056] [0.882] [0.988] 
         
III 
More than 
compulsory 1+ -0.009** 0.002 0.004 -8.683*** -4.009*** 5.807*** 
   [0.004] [0.007] [0.007] [0.921] [0.770] [0.763] 
  2+ -0.022*** -0.030*** -0.042*** -4.295*** -3.797*** 0.083 
      [0.004] [0.007] [0.007] [0.859] [0.730] [0.720] 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 
percent. The specification is the one presented in equation (E.1). The controls included are individual fixed effects, 
indicator for the time of the specific birth, time fixed effect by year of birth cohort, time fixed effect interacted with a 
dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual has completed compulsory education and finally year of birth 
effects interacted with the dummy indicating compulsory education. 
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Table 9 
2SLS estimates of the impact of fertility on mother’s selected outcomes. 
   
Last/current 
contract: Full 
Time 
Last/current 
contract: 
Temporary 
Last/current 
contract: Self-
employed 
Last/current 
contract: 
Short 
Current 
contract: Full 
time 
Current 
contract: 
Temporary 
Current 
contract: 
Self-
employed 
Current 
Contract: Short 
           
I Total 1+ -0.021*** 0.031*** 0.028*** -0.010* -0.031*** 0.022*** 0.024*** -0.022*** 
   [0.005] [0.005] [0.003] [0.006] [0.005] [0.004] [0.003] [0.006] 
  2+ 0.008* -0.012*** 0.001 -0.015*** 0.002 -0.018*** -0.004 -0.031*** 
   [0.005] [0.004] [0.003] [0.006] [0.005] [0.004] [0.003] [0.005] 
           
II Compulsory education 1+ -0.036*** 0.039*** 0.035*** 0.045*** -0.059*** 0.021*** 0.028*** -0.019** 
   [0.008] [0.008] [0.005] [0.010] [0.007] [0.007] [0.005] [0.009] 
  2+ -0.031*** -0.006 -0.005 -0.001 -0.025*** -0.014** -0.014*** -0.035*** 
   [0.007] [0.007] [0.005] [0.010] [0.007] [0.006] [0.004] [0.009] 
           
III More than compulsory 1+ -0.012* 0.026*** 0.024*** -0.046*** -0.013* 0.021*** 0.021*** -0.026*** 
   [0.007] [0.006] [0.004] [0.008] [0.007] [0.005] [0.004] [0.007] 
  2+ 0.034*** -0.016*** 0.005 -0.024*** 0.022*** -0.022*** 0.002 -0.027*** 
      [0.006] [0.005] [0.004] [0.008] [0.006] [0.005] [0.003] [0.007] 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. The specification is the one presented in 
equation (E.1). The controls included are individual fixed effects, indicator for the time of the specific birth, time fixed effect by year of birth cohort, time fixed effect 
interacted with a dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual has completed compulsory education and finally year of birth effects interacted with the 
dummy indicating compulsory education. 
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  Table 10 
2SLS estimates of the impact of fertility on second earner’s selected outcomes. 
 
Employed Days worked 
Monthly 
earnings 
Effective 
days 
worked 
Days of 
partial work 
Get 
unemployment 
insurance 
       
1+ 
-0.092*** -4.947*** 145.736*** -2.771*** 0.005 0.046*** 
 
[0.016] [0.543] [28.499] [0.480] [0.183] [0.013] 
2+ 
0.041** 3.427*** 99.189*** 1.173** 0.232 -0.030** 
 
[0.019] [0.641] [32.764] [0.573] [0.211] [0.015] 
       
 
Multiple 
contracts 
Last/current 
spell: 
Chaining 
Current 
spell: 
Chaining 
Duration 
last/current 
non-
employment 
spell 
Duration 
current non-
employment 
spell 
Duration 
current spell 
1+ 
0.063*** -0.085*** -0.088*** -3.368** 0.037 1.69 
 
[0.012] [0.020] [0.020] [1.568] [0.067] [2.620] 
2+ 
0.084*** 0.071*** 0.071*** -0.52 0.008 -29.544*** 
 
[0.014] [0.026] [0.026] [0.912] [0.038] [3.131] 
 Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 
percent; *** significant at 1 percent. The specification is the one presented in equation 
(E.1). The controls included are individual fixed effects, indicator for the time of the 
specific birth, time fixed effect by year of birth cohort, time fixed effect interacted with a 
dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual has completed compulsory 
education and finally year of birth effects interacted with the dummy indicating 
compulsory education. 
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Table 11 
2SLS estimates of the impact of fertility on second earner’s selected outcomes. 
 
Last/current 
contract: 
Full Time 
Last/current 
contract: 
Temporal 
Last/current 
contract: 
Self-
employed 
Last/current 
contract: 
Short 
Current 
contract: 
Full time 
Current 
contract: 
Temporary 
Current 
contract: 
Self-
employed 
Current 
contract: 
Short 
1+ 0.212*** -0.264*** -0.254*** 0.037** 0.207*** -0.262*** -0.253*** 0.025 
 [0.018] [0.014] [0.014] [0.016] [0.018] [0.014] [0.014] [0.016] 
2+ -0.210*** 0.219*** 0.209*** -0.013 -0.212*** 0.219*** 0.209*** -0.016 
  [0.022] [0.018] [0.017] [0.020] [0.023] [0.018] [0.017] [0.020] 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 
percent. The specification is the one presented in equation (E.1). The controls included are individual fixed effects, 
indicator for the time of the specific birth, time fixed effect by year of birth cohort, time fixed effect interacted with a 
dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual has completed compulsory education and finally year of 
birth effects interacted with the dummy indicating compulsory education. 
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Figure 1: Dynamic impact of the number of children on mother’s traditional extensive 
and intensive margins. Sample 1+. 
 
 
 
Note: Each point corresponds to the 2SLS estimates of  in equation (E.2) that 
represents the cost of a growth in family size in the period show in horizontal axis in 
comparison to those periods previous the increase of the family size. The grey area 
represents the 95% confidence interval. 
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Figure 2: Dynamic impact of number of children on mother’s traditional extensive 
and intensive margins. Sample 2+. 
 
 
 
Note: Each point corresponds to the 2SLS estimates of  in equation (E.2) that 
represents the cost of a growth in family size in the period show in horizontal axis in 
comparison to those periods previous the increase of the family size. The grey area 
represents the 95% confidence interval. 
  
	 39
Figure 3: Dynamic impact of number of children on mother’s traditional extensive 
and intensive margins. Sample 1+ by the mother’s level of education. 
 
 
 
Note: Each point corresponds to the 2SLS estimates of  in equation (E.2) that 
represents the cost of a growth in family size in the period show in horizontal axis in 
comparison to those periods previous the increase of the family size. Solid line, 
mothers with just or less than compulsory education. Dashed line refers to mothers 
with more than compulsory education. The grey area represents the 95% confidence 
interval. 
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Figure 4: Dynamic impact of number of children on mother’s traditional extensive 
and intensive margins. Sample 2+. Analysis by level of education of the mother. 
 
 
 
Note: Each point corresponds to the 2SLS estimates of  in equation (E.2) that 
represents the cost of a growth in family size in the period show in horizontal axis in 
comparison to those periods previous the increase of the family size. Solid line, 
mothers with just or less than compulsory education. Dashed line refers to mothers 
with more than compulsory education. The grey area represents the 95% confidence 
interval. 
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Figure 5: Dynamic impact of number of children on mother’s selected outcomes 
(second outcome group). Sample 1+. 
 
 
 
Note: Each point corresponds to the 2SLS estimates of  in equation (E.2) that 
represents the cost of a growth in family size in the period show in horizontal axis in 
comparison to those periods previous the increase of the family size. The grey area 
represents the 95% confidence interval. 
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Figure 6: Dynamic impact of number of children on mother’s selected outcomes 
(second outcome group). Sample 2+. 
 
 
 
Note: Each point corresponds to the 2SLS estimates of  in equation (E.2) that 
represents the cost of a growth in family size in the period show in horizontal axis in 
comparison to those periods previous the increase of the family size. The grey area 
represents the 95% confidence interval. 
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Figure 7: Dynamic impact of number of children on mother’s selected outcomes 
(second outcome group). Sample 1+. Analysis by level of education of the mother. 
 
 
 
Note: Each point corresponds to the 2SLS estimates of  in equation (E.2) that 
represents the cost of a growth in family size in the period show in horizontal axis in 
comparison to those periods previous the increase of the family size. Solid line, 
mothers with just or less than compulsory education. Dashed line refers to mothers 
with more than compulsory education. The grey area represents the 95% confidence 
interval. 
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Figure 8: Dynamic impact of number of children on Mother’s selected outcomes 
(second outcome group). Sample 2+. Analysis by level of education of the mother. 
 
 
 
Note: Each point corresponds to the 2SLS estimates of  in equation (E.2) that 
represents the cost of a growth in family size in the period show in horizontal axis in 
comparison to those periods previous the increase of the family size. Solid line, 
mothers with just or less than compulsory education. Dashed line refers to mothers 
with more than compulsory education. The grey area represents the 95% confidence 
interval. 
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Figure 9: Dynamic impact of number of children on mother’s selected outcomes 
(second outcome group). Sample 1+. 
 
 
 
Note: Each point corresponds to the 2SLS estimates of  in equation (E.2) that 
represents the cost of a growth in family size in the period show in horizontal axis in 
comparison to those periods previous the increase of the family size. The grey area 
represents the 95% confidence interval. 
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Figure 10: Dynamic impact of number of children on mother’s selected outcomes 
(second outcome group). Sample 2+. 
 
 
 
Note: Each point corresponds to the 2SLS estimates of  in equation (E.2) that 
represents the cost of a growth in family size in the period show in horizontal axis in 
comparison to those periods previous the increase of the family size. The grey area 
represents the 95% confidence interval. 
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Figure 11: Dynamic impact of number of children on mother’s selected outcomes 
(second outcome group). Sample 1+. Analysis by level of education of the mother. 
 
 
 
Note: Each point corresponds to the 2SLS estimates of  in equation (E.2) that 
represents the cost of a growth in family size in the period show in horizontal axis in 
comparison to those periods previous the increase of the family size. Solid line, 
mothers with just or less than compulsory education. Dashed line refers to mothers 
with more than compulsory education. The grey area represents the 95% confidence 
interval. 
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Figure 12: Dynamic impact of number of children on mother’s selected outcomes 
(second outcome group). Sample 2+. Analysis by level of education of the mother. 
 
 
 
Note: Each point corresponds to the 2SLS estimates of  in equation (E.2) that 
represents the cost of a growth in family size in the period show in horizontal axis in 
comparison to those periods previous the increase of the family size. Solid line, 
mothers with just or less than compulsory education. Dashed line refers to mothers 
with more than compulsory education. The grey area represents the 95% confidence 
interval. 
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Figure 13: Impact of multiple births on selected outcomes. Robustness check. Sample 1+. 
 
 
Note: Each point corresponds to the OLS estimates of the impact of multiple births on 
each of the outcomes using the specification in equation (E.2) but including a series of 
leads (placebo dummies). The first vertical line from left to right represents the 
approximately time of conception. The second line represents the time of birth. The 
grey area represents the 95% confidence interval. 
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Figure 14: Impact of multiple births on selected outcomes. Robustness check. Sample 1+. 
 
 
 
Note: Each point corresponds to the OLS estimates of the impact of multiple births on 
each of the outcomes using the specification in equation (E.2) but including a series of 
leads (placebo dummies). The first vertical line from left to right represents the 
approximately time of conception. The second line represents the time of birth. The 
grey area represents the 95% confidence interval. 
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Figure 15: Impact of multiple births on selected outcomes. Robustness check. Sample 1+. 
 
 
 
Note: Each point corresponds to the OLS estimates of the impact of multiple births on 
each of the outcomes using the specification in equation (E.2) but including a series of 
leads (placebo dummies). The first vertical line from left to right represents the 
approximately time of conception. The second line represents the time of birth. The 
grey area represents the 95% confidence interval. 
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Figure 16: Impact of multiple births on selected outcomes. Robustness check. Sample 2+. 
 
 
 
Note: Each point corresponds to the OLS estimates of the impact of multiple births on 
each of the outcomes using the specification in equation (E.2) but including a series of 
leads (placebo dummies). The first vertical line from left to right represents the 
approximately time of conception. The second line represents the time of birth. The 
grey area represents the 95% confidence interval. 
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Figure 17: Impact of multiple births on selected outcomes. Robustness check. Sample 2+. 
 
 
 
Note: Each point corresponds to the OLS estimates of the impact of multiple births on 
each of the outcomes using the specification in equation (E.2) but including a series of 
leads (placebo dummies). The first vertical line from left to right represents the 
approximately time of conception. The second line represents the time of birth. The 
grey area represents the 95% confidence interval. 
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Figure 18: Impact of multiple births on selected outcomes. Robustness check. Sample 2+. 
 
 
 
Note: Each point corresponds to the OLS estimates of the impact of multiple births on 
each of the outcomes using the specification in equation (E.2) but including a series of 
leads (placebo dummies). The first vertical line from left to right represents the 
approximately time of conception. The second line represents the time of birth. The 
grey area represents the 95% confidence interval. 
 
 
 
 
 
